In our last post we began an examination of the philosophical impossibility of the Latter-Day Saint (a.k.a. Mormon) view of God and how such a view is actually quite similar to, and suffers from the same problems as, the view of an eternally/necessarily existing universe/multiverse held by the likes of atheist Richard Carrier. Recall that Latter-Day Saint founder Joseph Smith, Jr. said everything, even spiritual things, are matter of some type1 and Latter-Day Saint philosopher Blake Ostler said,
…the Mormon God did not bring into being the ultimate constituents of the cosmos…the personal God of Mormonism confronts uncreated realities which exist of metaphysical necessity. Such realities include inherently self-directing selves (intelligences), primordial elements (mass/energy), the natural laws which structure reality, and moral principles grounded in the intrinsic value of selves…[emphasis mine].2
Likewise, as we previously saw, Carrier asserted,
Now, by "nature” we mean…nothing more than space, time, material, and physical law…if there are other materials, these would again be nothing more than mindless things populating the cosmos in just the same way as particles of matter and energy or the extension of being.…something must exist without any explanation at all, so it may as well be the multiverse [an ensemble of universes that account for all of physical reality]. For if a god can exist unexplained, with all his convenient attributes, then so can the multiverse. Both solutions leave the same questions unanswered. But we find the god hypothesis leaves far too many more questions unanswered. So we take the multiverse instead, as our ultimate 'brute fact.' In fact, the multiverse is a simpler explanation than god, because it has all those attributes of god sufficient to ground its own being and cause this universe to exist [emphasis mine].3
In the previous installment on this topic we discussed how material reality, and any changing thing, is a composite of act and potency, and that material substances specifically are composites of form and matter. Related to these distinctions, Aquinas makes one further fundamental distinction, that of essence and existence. As it relates to the act/potency distinction, essence is in potency to an act of existing.
It is clear from human experience that we are capable of discussing, and understanding, a variety of things without knowing whether or not they actually exist. Take our tree example from last time. If I said, “apple tree,” you would immediately know what I’m talking about regardless of whether or not you knew a specific apple tree existed. Likewise, if I said, “money tree,” you would still know exactly what I’m talking about (assuming you’ve heard the expression before). The difference between the two examples is that one type of tree actually exists in extra-mental reality and the other does not. This is the beginning notion of Aquinas’ distinction between essence and existence.
For Thomas, essence is “what it is to be a thing, that is, that through which something has being as a particular kind of thing.”4 Regarding material substances, he says,
That matter alone is not the essence of the thing is clear, for it is through its essence that a thing is knowable and is placed in a species or genus. But matter is not a principle of cognition; nor is anything determined to a genus or species [in the classical philosophical sense] according to its matter but rather according to what something is in act. Nor is form alone the essence of a composite thing, however much certain people may try to assert this. From what has been said, it is clear that the essence is that which is signified by the definition of the thing....Therefore, the essence clearly comprises both matter and form.5
Essence is sometimes referred to as “nature” or “quiddity.” We can know the essence, or nature, of a tree without knowing if any particular tree, be it an apple tree or a money tree, actually exists, its existence being what Aquinas called the esse or the act of existing. In other words, essence is what something is, and existence is whether something is. In composites of essence and existence, essence limits existence to being this thing rather than something else. Aquinas concludes,
Whatever is not in the concept of the essence or the quiddity comes from beyond the essence and makes a composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without the things that are its parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything about its existence: I can understand what a man is or what a phoenix is and nevertheless not know whether either has existence in reality. Therefore, it is clear that existence is something other than the essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very own existence, and this thing must be one and primary.6
This distinction is no small thing. For there are only three logical possibilities for something’s actually existing: it is uncaused, caused by another, or self-caused. Again, for the sake of argument, let’s grant the Latter-Day Saint notion of eternally existing matter, or Carrier’s notion of a necessarily existing multiverse (we will refer to both as “eternal matter”), neither of which began to exist. Can such eternal matter account for its own existence or have its necessity of itself? I’m convinced the answer is no.
To see why, consider this. We can all agree that some thing, a tree for example, undeniably exists. Recall that essence is what a thing is, and whatever is true of a tree is because of its essence or not. For instance, to be a tree is to grow roots, sprout leaves, etc., not to be in a particular location such as a backyard. We must ask, is existence part of what it means to be a tree? The answer is no. Even if all trees ceased to exist we would still know what a tree is because its essence and existence are distinct. For example, you can know what a unicorn is even though it does not actually exist. From where, then, does existence come? The tree either causes itself to exist, is uncaused, or is being caused to exist by something else. Self-causation is a contradiction and thus false. Trees go from potentially existing to actually existing and thus do not exist uncaused (causation being the reduction of some potency to act). Therefore, the tree is being caused to exist.
Whatever is causing the tree to exist is either receiving its existence from another or it necessarily exists by virtue of its essence. Like our infinite chain of train cars with no engine, a chain of existence-receiving causes cannot account for its own existence because it is an essentially ordered causal series. Hence, there must exist an uncaused cause, who’s essence simply is existence, causing all other things. As Being itself, its essence and existence are identical such that it is unlimited Being while everything else only has being.
As we have seen, material substances are necessarily composites of essence and existence. Recall also that Carrier defined nature, and thus the multiverse, as “nothing more than space, time, material, and physical law,” and Joseph Smith, Jr. said that everything consists of matter. Therefore, eternal matter is of necessity a composite of essence and existence. We have also seen that eternal matter cannot cause itself to exist since such a notion is logically incoherent. Hence, if eternal matter actually exists it would be dependent for its existence on something conjoining its essence with an act of existing. Again, this is yet another essentially ordered causal series that cannot be infinite. Therefore, there must be something whose essence is identical with its existence causing the alleged eternal matter to exist. Note that this joining of essence and existence must be conserved at every moment this eternal matter exists by that same cause who’s essence and existence are identical.
But why could not the eternal matter’s essence be existence so that it simply is existence? As we noted Edward Feser saying last time,
If essence and existence were not distinct, they would be identical; and they could be identical only in “something whose quiddity is its very act of existing ... such that it would be subsistent existence itself” (DEE 4). That is to say, something whose essence is its existence would depend on nothing else (e.g. matter) for its existence, since it would just be existence or being. But there could only possibly be one such thing, for there would be no way in principle to distinguish more than one.7
Recall that essence limits existence, hence, something who’s essence and existence are identical would be unlimited, unchanging, and simple (not composite). Aquinas works out the details of these implications in various places, but especially in his monumental Summa Theologiæ. Suffice it to say that, while we have not proven the whole of Christianity true with this argument, we can see that if eternal matter actually exists it is material and therefore limited, undergoes change, is a composed substance, etc. Thus, it is impossible for its essence to be identical with its existence and for it to have its necessity of itself. Therefore, it would require a sustaining cause conserving its existence at every moment it exists, and this cause’s essence and existence must be identical, meaning this cause is Pure Act and therefore uncaused.
In the end, the god of Joseph Smith, Jr. and the Latter-Day Saints is a created and finite being, and if he existed, he would be no more worthy of worship than our earthly fathers. It is not that the Latter-Day Saint god is probably not really divine and worthy of worship, it is a metaphysically necessary conclusion that he could not possibly be divine and worthy of worship. The only being truly worthy of worship is not a being at all, but rather He is Being itself and the source of everything else that exists. He is the the great I AM, the ultimate source of all worth, and the only one truly worthy of worship (Ex. 3:14; Col. 1:16-17).
For more information, see Francis Beckwith's paper, Mormon Theism, the Traditional Christian Concept of God, and Greek Philosophy: A Critical Analysis.
END NOTES
1. Doctrine and Convenants 131:7-8, https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/131?lang=eng
2. Blake Ostler, "The Mormon Concept of God," 67. Quoted in Francis Beckwith's Mormon Theism, the Traditional Christian Concept of God, and Greek Philosophy: A Critical Analysis, https://bearspace.baylor.edu/Francis_Beckwith/www/Sites/LDSGreek.pdf
3. Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2005), Kindle Locations 1563-1935, Kindle Edition.
4. Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Kindle Location 24.
5. Ibid., Kindle Locations 39-46.
6. Ibid., Kindle Locations 246-251.
7. Edward Feser. Aquinas (Beginner's Guides) (Kindle Locations 573-577). Oneworld Publications (academic). Kindle Edition.